

## New immigrants: a new community?

### The Chinese community in Peru in complete transformation

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#### Introduction

Just ten years ago, the interest in the Chinese Community of Peru was historical, sociological and anthropological. After retracing the conditions of the introduction of the first coolies (Stewart 1976), their role in the regional development as workers under contract in the haciendas (Macera 1977; Rodríguez 2009), then as immigrants integrated into the country's economy (Lausent-Herrera 1996, 1997), researchers have tried to understand the mechanisms which formed the Chinese community of Peru and they have begun to compare its formation to that of other communities (Wong 1978; McKeown 2001; Lausent-Herrera 2009a, 2009b, 2011). Quite recently, faced with the arrival of a great number of new migrants, attention is now given to its fragility and to its future (Lausent-Herrera 2009b).

Relatively isolated in the past compared with other overseas Chinese communities, the Peruvian Chinese community is now undergoing great changes. Its demography and its ethno-linguistic makeup are no longer the same, and this may in the near future modify the current institutional equilibrium. In addition to the arrival of a competing community at the end of the 1980s formed by new immigrants from Fujian, there was the entry of a great number of immigrants from the provinces of central and northern China just before the second millennium. These new immigrants are small and medium investors as well as employees in the big state or the semi-private Chinese companies recently implanted in Peru, who have seized the opportunity of their stay to remain in the country or to establish themselves in Latin America. In order to better know these new immigrants we have used four data bases set up from the data supplied by the DIGEMIN.<sup>1</sup> They contain a wealth of information about the number, the geographic origin and individual socio-demographic characteristics. We have also examined the commercial establishment projects which the immigrants are obliged to furnish to obtain Peruvian residence.

Faced with these changes, is the Peruvian Chinese community which, 20 years ago, was still homogeneous and integrated into the Peruvian nation, about to lose its unity, its Peruvianess?

In Peruvian eyes, the Chinese community is still made up of the numerous descendants of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century immigrants, the Tusans (*tusheng*), children born in Peru of Chinese parents, as well as three generations of Chinese descendants (Lausent-Herrera 2009b). They are eternally symbolized on one hand by Lima's Chinatown and on the other hand by the Wong parade during the national holidays. There are more and more *chifas* (Chinese restaurants), as well as dragon- and lion-dances. But the Limeños and the inhabitants of the emerging quarters of the capital and those of the provincial cities are also aware of the arrival of the new immigrants, of their presence in the new economic sectors and unfortunately also of the increasing number of news items featuring illegal immigration, human trafficking, the Red Dragon Mafia and illegal miners operating in Amazonia. If the Chinese community as the Peruvians see it still exists, it is affected by these upheavals. Already its homogeneity is compromised and what appears is a many-layered community, a kind of superposition of groups of people having the same interests or origins but who never meet, are not linked to the history of Peru, do not have diasporic roots and who often do not know how long they will spend in this country. Faced with this situation, reactions are varied. It is this succession of upheavals and their implications which will be studied in this chapter.

### The roots of the Chinese community in Peru: 162 years of immigration

The second half of the nineteenth century marked the economic expansion and modernization of a number of Latin American countries. This development would not have been possible without a strong migratory influx from Asia as well as Europe. The harvesting of guano and the sugar industry in Cuba and Peru were the first economic activities around which were organized the incoming Chinese under contract – respectively in 1847 and 1849 – destined to replace at more or less long term the employment of African slaves. It is estimated that nearly 100,000<sup>2</sup> coolies were brought into Peru between 1849 and 1874. The ill treatment they underwent is the cause of their high mortality which explains the loss of a great part of the young masculine population as it appeared on the occasion of the 1876 census.<sup>3</sup> Out of the 2,699,106 inhabitants registered, 49,956 were Chinese; representing at that time 1.8% of the total population. This does not represent the actual importance of this population grouped together in plantations scattered all along the coast of more than 2000 kilometers. What struck at the time was their strong concentration as in Lima where this same year they reached 10.8% of the population of the capital, or in the sugar valleys where they could represent up to half or more of the rural population. Everywhere this population, mostly masculine, began very early to integrate, thanks to intermarriage.

In 1874 the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was signed between Peru and China putting an end to human trafficking and giving the Chinese legal existence. Then a new Chinese immigration began in Peru, superimposed on that of the coolies. It was still in majority masculine, even if the arrival of a few women could be observed, and was made up of merchants, artisans and commercial employees from the southern Chinese provinces, the British colony of Hong Kong as well as from California. At the end of the 1860s the formation of secret associations and regional or native place associations (*huiquan*) allowed the Chinese freed from their contracts and the Chinese newcomers to create the foundation of a true community. This community affirmed its legal existence when Ambassador Zheng Zaoru came to Lima in 1884 and in 1886 during the creation under his authority of the society of charity and mutual aid, the *Beneficiencia China Tonghui Chongkai*,<sup>4</sup> following the model of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association of America in San Francisco.

In 1909 Peru denounced the treaty of 1874 and, inspired by the Gentlemen's Agreement concluded in 1907 between Japan and the USA, asked for a new agreement to be signed with

China so that China would control and limit its immigration. The Porras-Wu Ting-Fan Protocol marked the beginning of a series of restrictions to the free entry into Peru of the Chinese or their relatives. Despite or because of the economic and social success of a part of the population of Chinese origin, immigration restrictions – demands for passports, photographs, health and marriage certificates, financial guarantees, as well as the demonstrations and laws against Asians: the obligation to employ a Peruvian personnel, prohibition to leave an inheritance to a foreigner – would multiply and lead those hoping to immigrate to circumvent these laws.

Starting the first year that restrictions on immigration were installed, an entire network of corruption between the two countries developed (McKeown 1996, 2001). In China there were substitutions of identity, fabrication of false certificates of marriage or filiation, authorizations bought from the personnel of the Peruvian consulate, while in Peru government employees closed their eyes to the origin of certain documents certifying that the immigrant was a merchant returning to Peru after a trip to China while actually he had never before left China. The regional Chinese associations or *huiquan*, produced attestations in their turn proving that the immigrant was born in Peru, in a city or village where he had been unable to be registered and then had been sent to study in China. Finally, the best organized were the great commercial houses such as Wing On Chong or the Pow On Who, using the networks both of relatives and those from the same original village, brought over employees accompanied by false "relatives."<sup>5</sup>

The main maritime route to enter Peru passed by Japan, then California, to finally go down along the Pacific coast to Chile; for steamships this took from two to four months. But several events turned the immigrants from this route. Thus the difficulties encountered after the Exclusion Act of 1882 which forbade the entry to the USA of Chinese who were not merchants and regulated their transit, led some of them to take the longest route, the one that obliged them to leave the South Seas and go by the Indian Ocean, stop in Marseilles before going either to Lisbon or Liverpool to finally board the ship which would take them to South America. This route was taken more frequently from 1908 onwards when, to protest against the economic and territorial imperialism of their neighbors, the Chinese began to launch anti-Japanese boycotts. The boycotts prevented the immigrants from taking the Japanese steamers and obliged them to go around the world. When they arrived in Liverpool or Lisbon, they embarked for Manaus in Brazil, then went up the Amazon to Iquitos, the rubber capital of Peru where the Chinese consuls gave them documents attesting to their residence in Peru and sometimes even certificates of birth in the Amazon region. Otherwise, a Chinese community composed of merchants and rubber collectors established in Iquitos since 1880 took them in (Lausent-Herrera 1996). From Iquitos they could settle in the district of Loreto or travel on to finally reach the Pacific coast near the city of Chiclayo where a very old and large Hakka<sup>6</sup> Chinese community awaited them. Despite the fact that from 1930 on the military/civilian Peruvian regimes<sup>7</sup> in power further hardened their policy of restricting the entry of new Asians,<sup>8</sup> use of this route, which offered at the price of a very long and dangerous voyage, free entry into Peru, came to an end. Another way, leaving from Ecuador, took its place. A Chinese community made up of merchants and farmers had been established since the end of the nineteenth century between Guayaquil, Quevedo and Babahoyo and came to serve as a relay to those who entered illegally by the Ecuadorian frontier. Once in Peru the immigrants changed identity and joined the members of their family. Illegal entry did allow among other things the continued entry of young Chinese girls, including mixed bloods or *Tusans*<sup>9</sup> living in China, who were destined to marry within the community so as to continue Chinese domestic culture within the main families.<sup>10</sup>

New immigrants thus continued to arrive legally in very small numbers but above all, illegally, coming to insure the renewing of the community. At its head, the first generation Chinese assumed the institutional responsibilities while at its base, the generation of Peruvian-born

children of Chinese parents, the Tusans, as well as the large community of mixed bloods who had made up their own associations and had their newspapers and schools, gave an image of a prosperous and integrated community. When after 1950 the People's Republic of China withdrew into itself and closed its frontiers, it became more difficult to leave and in particular, more dangerous. Up until this date in Peru, the Chinese community had progressed and prospered despite the numerous measures taken to stop its growth. From then on, the renewal of its "legitimate" members, those coming from China, went on only very slowly. The aging community authorities favorable to Guomindang gave way to the increasing influence of the Tusans without losing their power within the *Sociedad Central de Beneficencia China*.

The breaking off of relations with the mother country was thus a shock and it was felt all the more forcefully because between 1950 and 1955 Peru, fearing Communism and following a still present anti-Asian racism,<sup>11</sup> closed its doors tightly to refugees, to wives as well as children who left to study in China and were separated from their parents. Under the regime of President M. Odria (1948–56), all persons with a Chinese family name, including the Tusans as well, were deprived of passports. In 1958 the new law on immigration intended to authorize the entry of 150 persons was so hardly implemented that in the year 1965 only 33 Chinese were allowed to enter under a quota for 50 persons (Ho 1967: 11). Recourse to illegality which had never ceased to palliate the various restrictions for entry to Peru became thus a necessity. Despite the danger and difficulty, a certain number of Chinese decided as soon as the Communist regime was in power to find refuge either in Macao where they already had family or in Hong Kong.<sup>12</sup> From there the most fortunate and determined attempted to go on to Peru. Networks for leaving were set up in Hong Kong with the help of Taiwanese intermediaries who left the welcoming of the new arrivals to the families and associations. The new route went by plane from Hong Kong to Hawaii, then to San Francisco before going down to the south.<sup>13</sup> In Guayaquil the new immigrants, often supplied with Taiwanese passports and after a waiting period, took up the road taken before the war by their predecessors and passed the frontier. But Peru, the country of refuge, was soon in its turn to become a country of emigration.

In 1968 the arrival in power of a leftist military junta at first paralyzed the Chinese community. Affected by the agricultural reform and affronted by the recognition in 1971 of the People's Republic of China, a great many Chinese – the exact number remains unknown – chose to leave Peru and go to the USA or Canada. From a demographic point of view, the halt in the Chinese immigration to Peru and the departure of a large number of Chinese and Tusans was slightly compensated for by the arrival of illegal immigrants. This considerably weakened the community which kept its cohesion and its position partly because of the great number of descendants of the Chinese who composed it.<sup>14</sup> According to the 1981 census, there remained in Peru only a population of 1,714<sup>15</sup> residents of Chinese nationality, as opposed to 10,915 in 1940.<sup>16</sup> Even if we believe that the number of Chinese is underestimated, 1981 is a key year in Chinese immigration to Peru for it marks at the same time the weakest representation of the Chinese born in China, the beginning of a very large Peruvian economic emigration to the USA<sup>17</sup> (which would affect without distinction all the social and ethnic levels of the Peruvian population including the Tusans and the Chinese in Peru) and the onset of a new immigration composed of the reactivation of the traditional flux plus the arrival of Chinese immigrants from regions up till now unknown to the Chinese community.

### **New Chinese immigration to Peru: how many, who, where they are, and what do they do?**

The old and new Chinese immigration to Peru, though visible through the myriad of new Chinese restaurants, small shops selling products imported from China; hotels, casinos and



"massage" centers and even in the informal gold mining in the Amazonian region of Madre de Dios, is not yet as visible in the official published statistics. In this section I will first assess how many and who are the old and new Chinese by analyzing critically published data and more detailed unpublished micro-data from different sources. As will become clear, not all sources tell the same story and none alone allows us to draw a complete profile of this population. In our analysis we will present first what the population census tells us about the long and short term Chinese immigrants. We will confront and complete this picture with official data on immigration flows. During my fieldwork in Peru, I had access to many detailed unpublished individual records from the National Immigration and Naturalization Directorate (DIGEMIN) concerning Chinese residents, entries and exits and requests made by Chinese immigrants to obtain a visa or to change their immigration status.

### *The difficulty of quantifying how many old and new Chinese are in Peru*

Accounting for demographic fluctuations in the Chinese community in Peru is a difficult task since after the census of 1876 it was not until 1940 that new national figures were available. The 1876 census registered 49,956 Chinese out of a total population of 2,699,160 whereas the 1940 census registered only 10,915 Chinese. These figures reflect both the negative impact of restrictive immigration laws focusing on Chinese immigrants during the 1930s and the weakness of the population census to reflect the real situation insofar as illegal immigration through the northern and southern borders and via the Peruvian Amazon River (Manaos-Iquitos route) developed also quite rapidly during the same period. Moreover, the importance of the registered decline seems exaggerated considering the entry of 22,993 Chinese only at Lima's harbor, Callao, during the 1904–37 period (McKeown 1996: 63). The figure of 10,915 Chinese registered in 1940, even if underestimated, in any case reflects the uncertainties faced by the Chinese community during the period preceding the Second World War. The post-war period did not offer better prospects either.

Data provided by the next census of 1961<sup>18</sup> distinguishes between country of birth and nationality, so the number of people of Chinese nationality decreased by half to 5,932 (5,210 men and 722 women). From this total of 5,932 people, most of them (5,766) were born in China, while 166 others were either born to Chinese parents in other countries (Ecuador, Panama, USA) or were born in Peru but were declared as Chinese nationals. Ten years later, in 1972, the population census does not give a much more optimistic view about the future of the Chinese community in Peru. Unlike the previous one, the 1972 census<sup>19</sup> makes a further distinction between the Chinese naturalized Peruvian (numbering 242) and the non-naturalized (3,815 individuals), adding to a total of 4,057. Considering their age, more than one-third (1,338) of the Chinese non-naturalized were older people (aged 65 or more), suggesting that a big part of this group were motivated to rejoin family members already in Peru. Around two thirds (2,354 individuals) were 15–65 years old. Only 102 non-naturalized Chinese were children aged 14 and under.<sup>20</sup> The lack of gender balance and more disaggregated data for the age group of 15–39 does not allow us to make a more detailed diagnosis on the state of the community. The decline of the Chinese (by around 1,000) in spite of the arrival of new Chinese immigrants fleeing the Maoist revolution, may be partially explained by the departure of old residents triggered by the coming to power of the leftist military junta in 1968.

When in 1981 we observed the arrival of new Chinese, it was still very difficult to quantify the flow for different reasons: first because their number was not yet very important despite some visibility especially in Lima's Chinatown, and second because the Immigration Office (DIGEMIN) had not yet published any statistics<sup>21</sup> on the number of visas granted or on the inflows and

outflows of the country by nationality. In addition, the first Chinese to enter at that time – mainly Cantonese, received by relatives – arrived as tourists and after one or two years spent living in small places a few buildings away from Lima's Chinatown or around the factories in the working class district of La Victoria, their situation was regularized through the purchase of national identity cards or resident cards from corrupt officials. Even regularized, all these new migrants had long sought to render themselves invisible and escape the census, hiding their illegal status of undocumented immigrants. This may partly explain the subsequent drop in the number of Chinese according to the 1981<sup>22</sup> census, passing to 1,714 individuals. For the first time the census distinguishes between country of birth, Taiwan<sup>23</sup> (523) and mainland China (1,191). Not yet offset by the arrival of new legal migrants, this low figure is difficult to explain except by the non-replacement of those arrived before the Second World War, the very restrictive quota policy and departures.

Twelve years later, the 1993 census<sup>24</sup> recorded a total of 3,728 individuals born in China living in Peru; more than double than in the 1981 census.<sup>25</sup> In reality this growth, low in absolute terms, corresponds to the restart of Chinese immigration to Peru, a figure that, again, does not reflect the exact situation. The illegal nature of most entries occurring in the late 1980s is probably the source of the unrecorded Chinese. This new contribution of immigration results in a greater concentration of people born in China in the capital, Lima, an increase between the two censuses of 78% to 87% with respect to the total number of Chinese in Peru.

Between the census of 1993 and that of 2007 the number of immigrants never ceased to increase, as proved by the opening of the numerous restaurants in Lima and in the emerging districts (*"los conos"*). At the same time, in the Barrio Chino the stores were moving out and installing their warehouses in the outskirts of Lima, and the quarter of San Borja saw the growth of hotels, spas, casinos and restaurants, and that of La Victoria was repopulated by Chinese working among other places in the clothing industry. The censuses were never able to represent either the changes or the excitement visible to all in Lima as in the province; for their number was increasing all over the country. Their movements first led them to the regions where small local Chinese colonies existed (Trujillo on the coast, Iquitos in Amazonia) then to the new regions with the aim of starting business or undertaking new activities linked to mining or forestry.

The 2007 census<sup>26</sup> strikingly suggests a stagnation of the demographics of the Chinese population in Peru since 3,450 individuals born in China are recorded. It also suggests a slight decrease in the concentration of Chinese in the capital city of Lima (from 87% to 85% between the 1993 and 2007 censuses).

However, one notes an abnormal decrease in the family size of the "old" immigrants in 2007 versus the size of this type of family in 1993; this could reflect the underestimation of the population born in China. We made a new estimation for 2007 of the population born in China who arrived in Peru before 2002, beginning with the hypothesis that the family size of this population had diminished in the same proportion as that noted between 1993 and 2007 for all of the families of the capital. According to our estimations, we should have observed 5,166 individuals born in China in 2007 and not the 3,450 indicated in the census, that is 50% more.

Interestingly enough, in comparing the censuses we observe a gradual feminization of Chinese migration: the sex ratio was 18.8 men per woman in 1941 and 7.2 in 1961, going to 2.6 in 1981 and further reduced to 1.6 in 1993. The sex ratio drops to 1.2 according to the 2007 census. The registers on the total number of Chinese residents in 2010 held by the DIGEMIN shows a sex-ratio of 1.3, confirming this long-run feminization tendency of the Chinese immigrants in Peru.

### The arrival of new Chinese in Peru

These figures reflect only the Chinese population in Peru but do not tell us anything about how many had arrived recently. To evaluate the importance of the flow of Chinese entering the country we must consider how many of those living in Peru in 2007 were residing abroad five years earlier. The same question was asked in the 1993 census so as to compare the evolution of the flow over a period of equal duration.

According to the 1993 census, 1,487 Chinese nationals (40% of the total identified) were not living in Peru before 1988. The 2007 census indicates that 801 individuals born in China and living in Peru were still living in China in 2002 (23% of all individuals born in China recorded in 2007). This would indicate that the flow of new migrants would have slowed considerably between 1993 and 2007, which again is unlikely.<sup>27</sup>

Indeed, official data from the DIGEMIN on migration flows (inflows and outflows) of individuals born in China or with Chinese citizenship can paint another picture (see Table 23.1). By combining the net flows during the period 2002–7 we can reconstruct the five years of cumulative flow in the 2007 census. Considering therefore the net cumulative inflows and outflows of individuals born in China it appears that the net migration flow is 3,726 people, well above the 801 persons recorded at the time of the census in 2007. One important weakness of this source is that it counts anonymous entries and exits instead of individuals. One individual may be counted several times if he or she enters and exits the country several times.

This demographic imbalance as the figures show will have an important impact on the evolution of the community between 1970 and 1980. These figures illustrate the ongoing crisis of the Chinese community (cf. Lausent-Herrera 2009b), whose institutional authorities are still Chinese born in China but the population is composed of many children of Chinese, Tusans and Peruvian mixed-bloods, who are very active in the community's social life.

Despite the creation in 1961 by a group of young Tusans encouraged by the Chinese curacy, of an association which represented them, relations between the Beneficencia China run by the "real" Chinese and the generations brought up in Peru are not good. This incomprehension pushed the Tusans to distance themselves from the associations led by the Beneficencia and to form their own associations, such as the Peruvian-Chinese Cultural Center (*Centro Cultural Peruano-Chino*). We then see a rupture both social and spatial insofar as the educated generation, aged

Table 23.1 Official (DIGEMIN) migration flows: individuals holding Chinese nationality

|              | Entries |         |       | Exits |         |       | Net balance |
|--------------|---------|---------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------------|
|              | Males   | Females | Total | Males | Females | Total |             |
| 2001         | 2824    | 1025    | 3849  | 2753  | 1042    | 3795  | 54          |
| 2002         | 3861    | 1190    | 5051  | 3969  | 1228    | 5197  | -146        |
| 2003         | 3935    | 1140    | 5075  | 3973  | 1256    | 5229  | -154        |
| 2004         | 5522    | 1778    | 7300  | 5272  | 1579    | 6851  | 449         |
| 2005         | 5364    | 1682    | 7046  | 4689  | 1445    | 6134  | 912         |
| 2006         | 7041    | 2453    | 9494  | 5161  | 1631    | 6792  | 2702        |
| 2007         | 4976    | 1722    | 6698  | 5001  | 1734    | 6735  | -37         |
| 2010         | 2741    | 1506    | 4247  | 2721  | 1464    | 4185  | 62          |
| 2011*        | 2081    | 1213    | 3294  | 2135  | 1252    | 3387  | -93         |
| Total 2001–7 | 33523   | 10990   | 44513 | 30818 | 9915    | 40733 | 3780        |

\* Figures refer to January to September

Source: DIGEMIN

from 25 to 45, did not made the choice of leaving for the USA or Canada but remained, and employed in liberal professions or integrated into government jobs and engaged in the political life of Peru. The separation is also spatial for several reasons: loss of interest in the Chinese quarter along with its commercial family activities, the necessity of displaying economic success by joining the new Peruvian upper middle class in the residential quarter of San Borja and finally the desire to give their children an education chosen in the new Sino-Peruvian Catholic school, Jean XXIII, located outside Lima's Chinatown. One can say that a first rupture has taken place but the community has not questioned the ethnic homogeneity founded on a common Cantonese culture and the sharing of the same history. The new immigration which began at the beginning of the 1980s concerns first the Cantonese who would reactivate the migratory current, more balanced from the gender point of view, which will little by little control the community institutions, prosper in the import/export business and actively take over the Chinese restaurant business as well.

The drastic change took place only with the arrival, by the end of 1980 and during the 1990s, of the first immigrants from Fujian. The languages were different, and the conditions of their arrival, in the majority of cases through the human trafficking networks, disturbed the community. Many entered but there were also many who left, and it was during this period that Peru became an important country of transit for the Chinese from Fujian, but there were also the Cantonese who wanted to go on to the USA or Canada.<sup>28</sup> Their commercial audacity and the funds which some of them disposed of irritated the inhabitants of the Chinese quarter who found themselves in competition with their own countrymen often better connected in China to the big export centers (of costume jewelry, clothes, lamps, toys, hardware, etc.). This competition which appeared at the same time that Peru improved economically had woken the Chinese quarter. The renewal of the 1990s coincided also with the increasing arrival of immigrants from Fujian and the first family gatherings.<sup>29</sup>

The information given by the DIGEMIN allows us to estimate only the visible part of this new immigration since identity theft and the possession of a passport of another nationality are the frequent means of clandestine immigration. Moreover, the statistics published by the DIGEMIN, also used in a INEI Bulletin, report the numbers concerning mainly the Lima airport and do not take into account, or only much later, the entries and exits at other frontier posts. Other errors caution us to use the DIGEMIN numbers with precaution. Thus, one notes that according to this source, in 2006, 6,792 individuals with Chinese nationality left the country while the corresponding number for those born in China is 3,789!<sup>30</sup> This is more surprising given the fact that the figures are nearly identical concerning the entries (9,344 for persons born in China and 9,494 for those with Chinese nationality). Finally it should be pointed out that at my request the statistical services of the DIGEMIN informed me that 18,604 Chinese had been naturalized between 1990 and 2003.<sup>31</sup> Given the numbers which we have exposed here concerning the total Chinese population residing in Peru, as well as the flow of new immigrants during this same period, it seems evident that a large number of them have not only escaped the census but also the statistics concerning the migratory flows produced by the DIGEMIN itself.

### *"Old" versus "new" Chinese*

While there are reasons to doubt the veracity of the number of Chinese in Peru according to the census, this source is nevertheless precious for it contains information about the socio-demographic characteristics of this population. Actually, the access to the microdata of the censuses of 1993 and 2007 has allowed us to have more details about the profile of the Chinese in Peru and how it has evolved according to the flow of new arrivals.

Several aspects separate the immigration population of China from the rest of the population. That is, demographically according to the census of 1993, the average age of the individuals born in China was 40.4 while the national average age was 25. This indicates that the Chinese colony was made up of people already elderly, which the immigration before 1993 had not yet succeeded in rejuvenating. In 2007 the numbers are quite similar (41.6 and 28.4 years old, respectively). The new arrivals are on average about eight years younger than the "old" immigrants: average age of the new arrivals being 31 against 46.8 for the arrivals in 1993 and 32.8 versus 44.3 respectively in 2007. Another interesting feature is that the size of the families of the "old" immigrants is larger than that of the new arrivals in the census of 1993 as well as that of 2007.<sup>32</sup>

The new arrivals born in China counted in the 2007 census differed from the "old" immigrants but also from the wave which arrived between 1988 and 1993, whose characteristics we know, thanks to the 1993 census. Thus the proportion of children less than 15 years old has greatly diminished among the new immigrants, according to the 2007 census, in reference to those counted in 1993 (from 14.4% to 7.7%), but the number of individuals aged from 45 to 54 has increased. In addition, if one examines the relationship with the head of household, the proportion of heads of household but also that of the spouses has increased with the new immigrants in 2007 versus those of 1993. On the other hand, the category which has substantially decreased (from 25.5% to 18.2%) is that of "other relatives." This again may reflect the fact that these persons were able to evade the census in the context of repeated scandals concerning the trafficking of Chinese immigrants and the assassination of "serpent heads" relayed by the Peruvian press. The proportion of new immigrants married or living with someone increased (from 58.7% to 62.2%) significantly to the detriment of bachelors (who went from 38.8% to 34.3%).

One of the characteristics which most distinguish the old from the new immigrants but also from the newer immigrants of 2007 versus those of 1993 is their integration into the labor market. The proportion of independent or self-employed workers increased considerably among the new immigrants (going from 14.7% for those of 1993 to 32.7% for those of 2007). Laborers practically disappeared among the new immigrants of 2007 (1.9%) although they were 10% of the new immigrants in 1993. At the same time, the percentage of bosses increased among the old immigrants, going from 21.6% to 34.2%. This evolution in the composition of the occupational categories in the migratory flux of the individuals born in China may be explained by the fact that the proportion of individuals having a higher level of education among the new immigrants of the 2007 census is higher than that of the new immigrants who arrived in Peru between 1988 and 1993. In 1993 there was only a difference of 10 points in the proportion of individuals having higher education between the old and the new arrivals (21.6% and 31.9%, respectively); in 2007 the gap widened, even when the proportion of those with higher education rose to 35.3% among the "old" immigrants while that of the new immigrants reached 44.1%.

These figures, as we can see, are very far from those usually given in international publications, and they offer a different vision of the Chinese community of Peru. If we look again at the figures produced by the Overseas Economy Year Book Editorial Committee (OEYBEC) of 1992, there would have been 52,000 Chinese overseas in 1982, and in 1991 this number would have risen to 500,000 (Dudley *et al.* 1994: 637). Hung Hui who uses the same source (OCEYBEC 1991, 1992: 491–4) evokes a census which concerned 39,000 persons of whom we find no trace inside the community, and advances the number of 1 million persons for the number of descendants (Hung Hui 1992: 142).<sup>33</sup> Without starting a controversy on definitions and the use of the term "Chinese" in the statistics, these figures are overestimated and exaggerated, unless they include at least three generations of descendants. They are less credible than those produced by the Peruvian statistics, which actually underestimate. Dudley, Mao and Yun (1994) have noted an increase between 1980 and 1990 of more than 20% in Chinese

immigration to three Latin American countries; the increase may be even higher, but here too the numbers are lacking.

If they settle in Lima as part of the migratory chain with or without a plan of leaving one day to reside in the USA or if they are in Peru in more or less prolonged transit, these new arrivals are visible and invisible at the same time, and are diverse by their regional origins. The illegality of their situation and the legalization of their stay obtained by roundabout means do not allow us to know their exact number. Corruption among the frontier police and the government officials throws doubt upon all the statistics.

### *Immigrants or sojourner?*

The sharp decline in the total Chinese residents according to the 2007 population census should be considered with caution. The DIGEMIN has individual records on the immigrant population resident in Peru in 2010 with its basic socio-demographic characteristics.<sup>34</sup> According to this unpublished source, in 2010 a total of 5,533 Chinese resided in Peru. This data base registers, among others, the year of arrival of all still present in 2010. Considering only those arrived until 2007, the data reveal that 2,683 Chinese were living in Peru, more than 50% than those registered by the 2007 census.<sup>35</sup>

Looking closely at arrival dates, around half (51.5%) of these 5,533 Chinese residents in 2010 arrived during the 2008–10 period. This not only reflects the renewed and very visible impulse of recent Chinese immigration to Peru but also give some clues to the apparent decline in the size of the Chinese population in Peru in the years before 2008. This may have several explanations. First, this situation may be explained by the great number of those who have obtained Peruvian citizenship, both legally and illegally. Second, it reveals that new Chinese immigrants do not come to Peru to stay for long periods (on average they stay for four years). According to the same source, one quarter of the Chinese residents in 2010 had in fact re-entered the country. This can be linked to the fact that almost one-third (32%) declare a Latin American country as the country they come from before arriving in Peru.

This is confirmed if we consider instead another DIGEMIN data source related to the flow of Chinese entering and exiting the country during the period January 2010 to September 2011 (see Table 23.2). The DIGEMIN database has 15,113 individual records (7,541 entries and 7,572 exits). This data gives an even more important proportion of Chinese nationals coming from neighboring countries. In effect, we observe that more than one-third (35.7%) entries come from one of the five neighboring countries around Peru (Chile alone accounting for 12.2%, followed by Ecuador and Brazil with 8.3% and 8.1%, respectively). Other Latin American countries also represent a big share of Chinese entries to Peru (21.5%). This reflects a great degree of (short distance, intra-regional) mobility and means that it would be more realistic to consider these flows as part of a circulatory movement in three big circles. The first has an intra-regional dimension in which the Chinese take advantage of business opportunities linked to different economic regulations. There is an active trade triangle formed by northern Chile and the Peruvian and Bolivian Titicaca lake region (much of this trade takes the form of smuggling of counterfeit products coming particularly from China). The second, concerning mostly Argentina, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, is probably linked to big business and capital investments. The Chinese going back and forth between Peru and China, notably those coming from and going to Holland (a hub for many flights linking China to South America) constitute the third circle of the migratory flows. They are probably the most established group (already having resident cards in Peru or other Latin-American countries).

The net balance of these circular migratory movements is almost zero, which reflects their high mobility. These short-term sojourners are more motivated by their investment and business

Table 23.2 Entry and exit flows for Chinese nationals from January 2010 to September 2011 by percentage

| <i>Country before entry to Peru/<br/>Destination country when exit</i> | <i>Entries</i> | <i>Exits</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|--|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| EE.UU  | 9.8            | 9.9          | 9.8          |
| Canada   | 3.1            | 3.8          | 3.4          |
| Holland  | 20.5           | 21.8         | 21.2         |
| China (R.P)  | 3.29           | 6.16         | 4.72         |
| International Waters   | 1.1            | 1.1          | 1.1          |
| <b>Neighbor Countries</b>  |                |              |              |
| Chile  | 12.2           | 11.2         | 11.7         |
| Ecuador  | 8.3            | 7.9          | 8.1          |
| Brazil   | 8.1            | 7.3          | 7.7          |
| Colombia   | 4.4            | 4.7          | 4.6          |
| Bolivia  | 2.7            | 3.0          | 2.9          |
| <b>Sub-Total</b>   | <b>15.3</b>    | <b>15.0</b>  | <b>15.1</b>  |
| <b>Other Latin American Countries</b>                                  |                |              |              |
| Argentina  | 6.5            | 5.5          | 6.0          |
| Venezuela  | 4.5            | 4.0          | 4.3          |
| Mexico   | 3.6            | 3.8          | 3.7          |
| Panama   | 3.2            | 2.5          | 2.8          |
| Cuba   | 1.3            | 1.9          | 1.6          |
| Costa Rica   | 1.0            | 0.7          | 0.9          |
| <b>Other Countries</b>   | <b>6.4</b>     | <b>4.9</b>   | <b>5.7</b>   |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>100</b>     | <b>100</b>   | <b>100</b>   |

Source: DIGEMIN, entry and exit flows to (from) Peru, January 2010 to September 2011, unpublished micro-data.

projects; whereas in the past they were more motivated by family reasons (rejoining parents already settled in the destination country, etc.). Finally, it is worthwhile to note that there were almost no Chinese expelled from the country (only five during the period analyzed) despite the big number of illegal residents. Probably, only those who are sought after by the Chinese justice fell into that category;<sup>36</sup> the others were allowed to stay or they moved to another country within the region.

### Activities and regions of origin

In a preceding work using the data on visa applications by the Chinese for the first semester of 2003 (Lausent-Herrera 2009a: 87–8),<sup>37</sup> it was possible to analyze the situation of people who had declared themselves guarantors for the arrival of future immigrants. We noted then that the three-fourths of the guarantors were of Chinese origin who had arrived in Peru between 1995 and 2000, during the period of the regular increase in Chinese immigration and above all the arrival of the Fujian immigrants. The interest of this study was to show which sectors of the Peruvian economy they were able to integrate into. It turns out that 60% worked in the restaurant business and 52.5%<sup>38</sup> among them declared that they earned between \$1,000 and \$2,000, while 26.4% worked in the import/export business or in the workshops and factories. We can see that although they had arrived recently, the immigrants originating in Fujian were already well represented in the restaurant sector, in competition with the Cantonese. The very weak representation of Chinese from other provinces among the guarantors is explained by the fact that the people originating in the Northern and Central provinces had arrived as employees of Chinese companies

and were not part of the network favoring illegal entries and illegal stays. This system was most often dominated by the human traffickers who obliged their clients, once installed and their situation legalized, to be guarantors to allow other immigrants from Fujian or Guangdong to obtain a visa for Peru.

As we have seen, the arrival of new immigrants has changed the ethnic composition of the Chinese present in Peru. In the past, in spite of some linguistic diversity (Pun Yui, Hakka, Hokklo and Langtou from Chaxi in Zhongshan), the immigrants shared the Cantonese culture and spoke both their dialects and Cantonese. In this sense they formed a relatively homogeneous community. The present situation is different insofar as it is this relative ethnic and cultural homogeneity which is in question. According to the most recent data obtained from the DIGEMIN for the year 2009<sup>39</sup> concerning the total of 758 persons who requested a change in their immigration status after entering Peru with a tourist or business visa, the situation is the following. The Cantonese who number 275 still represent, with 36.3% of the total, the majority in terms of geographical provenance. The applicants from Fujian number 243 and they follow the Cantonese closely with 32.1% of the total. Among all of the Chinese provinces, only one is not represented: Qinghai. In terms of representation, the others can be grouped as follows: the southern part of the northern region (Shandong, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin) representing 13.2%, with 100 applicants; those of the central region (Shanxi, Shaanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Jingxi, Hunan) representing 6.2% with 47 applicants, the northeast region or Dongbei (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning), and Mongolia representing 5.2%, that is 39 applicants, and from the central southern region (Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu) representing 4.4% with 33 applicants. Grouping together the three regions of the central and the northern regions represents a relatively large 15.8% in clear opposition to the provinces of the west and southwest which make up only 2.8% of the whole.

### *A tradition of immigration: Cantonese and Fujianese*

The first coolies embarked at Amoy were the Hokkiens from the southern Fujian, the Hakkas, then the Cantonese. With the shifting of the Chinese workers' embarkation point to Hong Kong and then Macao, a diversification in recruitment took place. With time the Hokkiens disappeared and the Hakkas were no longer from the northeast of the province of Guangdong but those dispersed in the Si-Yap counties and in the county of Xiangshan (Zhongshan). From 1868<sup>40</sup> the Cantonese (Punyui) and the immigrants from the San-Yap equally represented an important part of Chinese immigration to Peru. The Fujianese who arrived at the end of the 1980s came from Fuzhou, Quanzhou (the Anxi Valley, particularly Nanping) and Zhangzhou. These Fujianese have no relation with the first Hokkiens who for a long time now are no longer represented within the institutions. To the Cantonese established in Peru for 162 years, these immigrants have no ties with the present community. Their differences are along linguistic and cultural lines. However, they have the same history of diaspora, the same migratory behavior (associations, family networks) and share essentially the same commercial activities. Even if their relations are strained, they can, as immigrants, be considered as making up the same group.

Each region and each province has a different migratory representation. In comparison with the observations of the preceding years, among those applying for a change in their immigration status there is a resemblance between the behavior of the Cantonese and the Fujianese. However, several differences can be observed due to the conditions of the arrival of the first Fujianese through the mafia networks and because they are not yet "stabilized" since many of them residing in Peru still keep the idea of leaving one day for the USA or Canada. The rapidity with which the economy evolves and the change in the poles of attraction have resulted in Peru now appearing for many of them no longer only as a country of transit but also as a country capable






Figure 23.1 New immigrants distribution by origin 2009

of bringing them wealth. This evolution is perceived by the Cantonese in transit as well as by the workers under contract ready to stay in Peru longer than planned.

The first Fujianese<sup>41</sup> men and women who arrived at the beginning of the immigration and chose to remain in the 1990s now have adult children. DIGEMIN's 2003 sources indicate that immigration by family regrouping had begun already. Upon arrival, their first place of stay was the Barrio Chino, where they were the least visible and where they could profit from the aid of the Beneficencia China.<sup>42</sup> From an immigration point of view, the Fujianese who remained in Peru had thus the same behavior, the same strategies for economic integration. In 2009,<sup>43</sup> 73.7% of the Fujianese and 63.3% of the Cantonese requested immigrant status, which would allow them to go from the status of foreigner with a temporary visa to that of resident.<sup>44</sup> Among the applicants for a change of immigration status, the professional category most represented was that of merchants and entrepreneurs (60.5% in the case of the Fujianese and 46.6% of the Cantonese). Therefore more Fujianese arrived already established with a better defined commercial project, thanks to their contacts in China and Peru. The Cantonese are professionally less represented among the merchants but more of them would like to be investors: 12.4% of the Cantonese residents requested a requalification as investors; 9.5% requested it upon their arrival in Peru. Investor status is obtained only under the condition of depositing a capital of \$25,000 in the Banco de la Nación. The 12.4% had thus found capital in Peru or, thanks to notarial paperwork, had become stockholders for an equivalent sum in enterprises already created. Inversely, according to the 2009 figures, the Fujianese, though very successful as traders, were much less present as investors. In effect, while 21.6% requested the merchant status, only 8.6% of them requested the investor status. The Fujianese are less numerous in requesting investor status, 8.6% in all compared to 21.6% for the Cantonese.

This difference does not correspond to the visual reality we have seen concerning the commercial activities of the Barrio Chino (Lausent-Herrera 2011: 92). When the migratory current from Guangdong started up again in the early 1980s, the economic situation in Peru worsened. During the following years the Chinese quarter saw its activities collapsed and there was insecurity. Hyperinflation and the terrorist attacks in Lima until 1994 hindered the economy. During this period the Cantonese, who controlled the entire Chinese restaurant sector, began to lose ground because the Fujianese, who among others needed a place of welcome and a waiting space for the illegal immigrants leaving for the USA, opened up more restaurants. At the end of the 1990s, with the economic upturn and renovation of the Chinese quarter's principal avenue, the Fujianese developed their activities, based on the import of Chinese manufactured products (lamps, hardware, costume jewelry, toys, medicines, apparel). By opening new restaurants in the residential quarter of San Borja, occupied mainly by rich Tusans, as well as warehouses in the emerging districts of the capital, they brought about the emergence of a new Chinese commercial cluster that will, perhaps in the near future, give birth to a new Chinatown. The new Cantonese immigrants and above all the Tusans accompanied them in this new commercial expansion. This dynamism, which put the Cantonese and the Fujianese in competition with each other, was carried along by Peru's remarkable economic growth and new-found stability. It also benefited from the advantages (sometimes unfair) given to Chinese producers and merchants not only in China but also through measures favoring imports and investments included in the Treaty of Free Commerce (*Tratado de Libre Comercio*) between China and Peru, effective by 1 March 2010. Another reason for such dynamism is the existence of the *Tarjeta Andina de Migración* (TAM), which offered Chinese immigrants and residents the possibility to circulate doing business around the Andean countries.

Cantonese and Fujianese investors, equally attracted by the advantages procured by the new treaty as well as by the facilities given by the TAM card, increased in number each year and diversified. What is striking is the rapid reaction by the new Chinese immigrants to the new measures which Peru or any other country takes to promote commercial exchanges. In this case the modification of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Law (*Ley ATPDEA*) in 2008 allowed the Andean countries to export to the USA with reduced taxes formerly protected products, such as textiles. Investors, particularly the Cantonese, hurried to propose projects for the manufacture of textile products for re-export to the USA or to other Andean countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia) thus reproducing the system of the *Maquiladoras*.<sup>45</sup>

L. Huang,<sup>46</sup> in his "feasibility dossier" submitted to the DIGEMIN in 2010,<sup>47</sup> announces his desire to establish a textile industry (by importing Chinese fabrics) with three other stockholders. He states that he wants to be a pioneer by importing the latest techniques and states that he is ready to export to other Andean countries and to the USA. Huang finds himself in competition with another Cantonese, a recently naturalized Ecuadorian<sup>48</sup> who immigrated to Peru to enter the apparel industry, particularly in the fabrication of jeans. As for X. Ye, a Cantonese resident in Ecuador and a transient immigrant, he wants to create large warehouses in Peru for the import of electronic equipment.

The Fujianese, who upon arriving mainly chose the *chifas*, the spas, the Internet kiosks, are now investing in longer-term projects and taking over certain sectors already occupied by the Cantonese. This is the case of J. Luo who, intending to profit from tax exonerations and the ATPDEA Law, would like to create a fruit and cereal-based food products packaging enterprise, so as to export the products to the Andean countries. His compatriot C. Wang, already settled in Guayaquil and dealing with a Chinese in Peru engaged in the business of importing electronic products, has asked to benefit from the status of investor immigrant-TAM so as to invest in the enlarging of a textile factory, promising to transfer the technology. Like the Cantonese

who first invested in this sector as private owners, D. Cao too has a logging project in Pucallpa (in the Amazonian forest) by implanting an industry of derived products in La Victoria district of Lima. Another investment project proposed by Liang M. relates to a sea cucumber aquaculture firm in the northern region of Peru.

Among the applicants for changing immigration status in 2009, 31.5% were women and among them 42.9% were Cantonese and 34.2% Fujianese. Compared to preceding years the proportion of women has not changed. However we found a difference in migratory behavior by ethnicity. This difference can be explained by the fact that the new Cantonese immigrants arrived a little before the Fujianese and benefited from their family networks to integrate more rapidly and begin regrouping their families earlier, in greater numbers and permanently. In the case of the Fujianese, the situation differed in that even if the women immigrated and worked, fewer of them were brought over as wives. Fujianese of both sexes were a long time in transit before deciding to bring over their family. Once they entered Peru few of them requested the status of investor; they were however more numerous in occupying places in commerce or in the import business. On the other hand, 16.4% of the Cantonese women and 14% of the Fujian women asked to remain in Peru under the status of "family gathering" and in their condition of "housewives." This confirms the fact that a part of the Fujian immigrants have chosen to remain in Peru.

The families of Lucy and Linda suffered a loss of status during the Cultural Revolution. Their father, an intellectual from Fuzhou (Fujian), was married to the daughter of a wealthy wood merchant of Shanghai when they were separated and he was sent to the mountains in Nanping. Of the four children, the two brothers are now in Shanghai but the two daughters have emigrated. Lucy, the oldest (born 1955), after her divorce in 1993, sold her shoes and clothing business and left with an Argentine visa and US \$2,000 in her pocket. A Chinese friend established in Buenos Aires welcomed her to the restaurant where she worked as a cashier. Three years later Lucy was married and obtained Argentine nationality. As her father was ill, she sold everything and returned to China. After his death, with her Argentine passport she returned this time to Peru, as the local sale representative for a brand of shoes made in Shenzhen. In Peru she asked to be a resident immigrant, then divorced her Peruvian husband and brought over her sister in 2003 as a worker under a three-year contract. Linda (born 1963) who was divorced in China in 1983, saw in her sister's call the opportunity to leave behind her job as an employee in a local insurance company. After taking over the shoe business while her sister opened a *chifa*, Linda found herself alone. Lucy sold her businesses and, as an Argentine, requested a visa for the USA. Linda remains alone in Peru and tries to manage by opening a business in lamps imported from China.

This brief account shows that the women, whether Cantonese or Fujianese, are an integral part of this migratory phenomena and not all their experiences are successful. It also shows the enormous mobility of the immigrants and their ability to change nationality and to adapt to the immigrant status offered by their host countries.

### Immigrants from other provinces under contract and emissaries<sup>49</sup>

As mentioned the Cantonese and the Fujianese form a separate group with a long-standing migratory tradition. The case of the immigrants from other regions is different, for these latter integrate, privately or as employees of the big groups, into a Chinese national project of economic expansion, of market conquest and a search for raw materials.<sup>50</sup>

Access to the applications for change in immigrant status as well as the inscription records in the immigrant registers for 2009–10<sup>51</sup> shows an evolution in comparison with past years.<sup>52</sup> There are more and more immigrants representing small and medium companies which send investors or open a branch office in Peru to sell to the Andean countries. The majority recruits in China

the professionals they need with no distinction of region. However, certain big companies who sometimes have a marked regional identity bring their personnel over from this region; this is the case of the mining company Junefield, subsidiary of Hunan Taiji Constructions, which brought over 35 people, mostly from Hunan. Others, such as the Huawei del Peru (telecommunications) bring over collaborators from all over China (Sichuan, Mongolia, Hubei, Shandong, Hunan, Shaanxi, Jiangsu and Guangdong). These new residents, who do not know the Chinese community of Peru, live among themselves but sometimes remain in Peru. Those who come on their own account are very mobile but may also settle down.

### *Immigrants from Zhejiang,<sup>53</sup> Shanghai and Jiangsu*

C.H. Chang and X. Chen, from Jiangsu, are associated with two different corporations which import and distribute farm and industrial machinery and automobiles. The former's company has diversified by entering the construction sector. Another Chinese, S. He, also from Jiangsu, started a sawmill project in 2009 in the Peruvian Amazon (Pucallpa), no doubt attracted by the fact that other Chinese are already exploiting forest concessions. L. Zhong directs the import house LERC Industrial. The *Siglo Nuevo*, created as a company by a Chinese man from Zhejiang, has two textile factories in La Victoria (Lima) and in Callao (the port zone), and imports its cloth from the same province. These new entrepreneurs have joined other companies installed in Peru such as Fuda Mining,<sup>54</sup> the Wanxin group from Zhejiang, makers and distributors of motorcycles with enormous success in Amazonia as well as the service companies (development, financing, and engineering) from Shanghai such as Mexiasia or Mundo Bebe Co. where children's clothes are made, with subsidiaries in Ecuador and Colombia.

This region represents only 12.4% of the requests for change of migratory status but it stands out for two reasons: its masculinity, 90.9% of male immigrants, and its youth, 76% of the immigrants in the age group 21 to 40. We note also that three-fourths of the applicants are entrepreneurs already present in Peru showing in this way their desire to stay to develop their economic activities. The other requests made in 2009 come from engineers and fishermen called over under contract by private and state-owned companies. Among the group of applicants for 2009, this region has the most investment projects after the Guangdong-Fujian block.

If we consider the applicants for immigration status from the southern region of the North (Shandong, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin), the medium size investors are not numerous. However, we note the presence among those originating in Hebei<sup>55</sup> of a number of engineers (15%) linked to the increasing number of entries into Peru of large and small mining groups.<sup>56</sup> They are as solicited as those coming from the provinces in central China. But the large group among the applicants for immigrant status is that of the sea-faring personnel, 57%, or crewmen.<sup>57</sup> The professionalization of the immigrants from this region explains its high rate of masculinization (93%). Three fourths of them have answered an employment offer already formed by the Chinese employer. Unfortunately the document does not state who the employers are. During the last Business summit which took place in Lima in 2011<sup>58</sup> between Chinese investors and Latin Americans, the delegation of the Tianjin government showed its desire to promote its automobile industry, its production of machines for mining and the chemical industry. It is highly probable that the number of immigrants linked to these projects will increase in the next few years.

### *The provinces of Dongbei (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) and Mongolia*

There are also migrants from this region of China. But unlike Europe, particularly France,<sup>59</sup> this is not apparently a migration of displaced workers. In Lima, the people from Dongbei form a

small group of persons whose distribution of men/women is relatively well balanced (43.6% women and 56.4% men), an equilibrium close to that reached by the Cantonese community thanks to family regrouping. Present for ten years in Peru, they come in regularly in small numbers and their activities are not yet "targeted": they may be fishermen, employees, accountants, engineers, distributors of Chinese products such as cell phones, etc. In 2009 12 applicants for a change of immigration status declared themselves entrepreneurs and merchants and three asked for a family regrouping. Thus there exists a small nucleus of independent immigrants from the Northeast, not linked to the big Chinese companies, who are now settling in. The projects of some of these new immigrants tend toward the sectors already occupied by the Fujianese, such as opening hotels and spas, building projects, forest development and mining prospections.<sup>60</sup>

### ***Central China provinces (Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Jiangxi, Hunan)***

Migrants from this region are sought after by the large Chinese mining groups. Certain companies (the Anhui Geology and Mining Investment or the Hunan Taiji Construction Material) come originally from these traditionally mining regions. A number of employees arrive with a contract made in China and then, once in Peru, want to regularize their situation and request immigrant status. As with the regions mentioned previously, we find a nucleus of persons already settled in Peru since the beginning of the 2000s, which shows that there is a certain regularity in their installation. What is exceptional is the quality of the immigrants, 70% of whom are highly qualified (70% are over 31 years of age, 76% are men); they are mostly engineers, company administrators, accountants, lawyers, technicians and geologists. Only 6.4% are merchants and entrepreneurs; their investments go into companies which import machines for mining, the import of chemical products also destined for mining, or the import of textiles. Some of them are involved in projects of small private companies for mining prospect.

### ***The provinces of the West and South West***

Migrants from these provinces are very little represented, but like those from central China, the immigrants requesting a change in their migratory status are related to contracts for qualified persons, the majority of which are men (62.5%): engineers, technicians, accountants, economists, professors and journalists and a few entrepreneurs. However, in the case of Sichuan the situation may change. Actually, several delegations of the provincial government of Sichuan have regularly shown interest in Peru.

### ***The gold rush***

The new Chinese immigrants are thus merchants, small and medium entrepreneurs and employees recruited in China by big companies such as Huawei (telecommunications) and the great mining and petroleum companies which have obtained concessions from the Peruvian Government. They are found with other foreign companies in the largest sites: the Jinzhao Mining at Pampa de Pongo (Ica), the Zijin and its crossborder deposits in the region of Piura, the Lumina Copper at Cajamarca, Chinalco and the Toromochi project (see Figure 23.2) in the Junin region. These companies have their own suppliers of mining material and chemical products. But next to them are a number of small and medium investors who devote themselves to prospecting, or more often to buying mining concessions from the Peruvians. They are also bringing in machines for the extraction of minerals and most often furnish the illegal (in the protected zones) and informal




Figure 23.2 Map showing Chinese communities in Peru

(in regions authorized but not controlled) mining concerns. Since 2008 groups of Chinese gold prospectors have increased and established themselves on the banks of the Malinowski (Inambari-Madre de Dios) and Nusimaskato (Carabana-Puno) rivers.<sup>61</sup> They are heavily armed, normal in this lawless Amazon region of multiple frontiers, and they resist the expulsion injunctions of the national authorities. The government forces have attempted several times to get them out but in vain and several complaints have been lodged. The attraction of gold, of minerals in general, is very strong among certain immigrants. This activity has revealed itself to be the refuge for a number of delinquents who have been accused of human trafficking.<sup>62</sup> Can they be considered ordinary immigrants? This is difficult to decide insofar as they remain in Peru for several years.

Concerning the immigrants whose profile we have attempted to draw according to the region they come from and their occupations, a large number of them are under contract and do not stay in Peru, but we should not exclude those who decide to stay and are difficult to quantify and locate. The merchants and investors, although legally residents and often even naturalized, are also mobile and adapt quickly to changes (success or failures) in their business. They enjoy mobility once Peru allows them to pass through all the South American countries. Finally, there also exists an invisible immigration, unrecorded: those who reside in Peru for a more or less long period of time, before being led to the USA, to Canada, and to Europe. The majority of them carry false identity papers and most often they work in the *chifas*. Some of them stay in Peru: this is the case of the Cantonese and Fujianese who renounce temporarily the continuation of their voyage. This group of immigrants can with difficulty pretend to form a community; however, they may weaken and challenge the present Chinese community of Peru.

### Chinese community or Chinese communities in Peru

From an institutional point of view, the Chinese community of Peru groups together in Lima, under the thumb of the *Tong Hui Chong Koc* or the *Sociedad Central de Beneficencia China*, eight regional associations (*huiguan*) and a Beneficencia in the port of Callao,<sup>63</sup> whose founding goes back to the second half of the nineteenth century. There are 21 associations in the province among which a certain number have survived or regained life in the years 1970–80 thanks to the Tusans. A number of other associations, corporative, educational, sportive, for women or leisure, are attached to them but not dependent upon them. Their activities have evolved along with the age of their members and the arrival of new immigrants, the distancing of the Tusans,<sup>64</sup> economic crises and the more or less good management of the directors. There are some associations which have remained faithful to Taiwan<sup>65</sup> and whose members hesitate between their attachment to the old associations which have gone over to the People's Republic of China and their attachment to Guomindang. Only the presidents of the regional associations of Lima and the province can elect the three presidents of the Beneficencia China for a three-year term. The rules decree that only the Chinese-born may accede to the management positions most desired because they allow entrance into the most advantageous political, commercial and social networks. It is not rare that some presidents remain in power for nine years and when they leave their position, they still sit on a committee managing other powerful functions.

The present presidents are between 60 and 70 years old. They are part of the Cantonese who arrived just before the opening in 1980 and the renewing of the migratory flow. As in the case of the presidents of the regional associations, it has been difficult for them, despite the arrival of new immigrants, to maintain their activities during the years of hyperinflation and violence. The frequent visits of delegates from the regional governments, the district capitals, the party secretaries, their entreaties and invitations have reminded the directors that they should above all work for the interests of China.<sup>66</sup> By a phenomenon of mutual attraction and guided by the advantages to be gained, the Chinese of Peru including the Tusans have drawn closer to the Chinese Embassy. It is much more open for them, and it is interested in their activities. It encourages the generations of Peruvian-born Chinese and the second and third generation Tusans to go to study in China.<sup>67</sup> The cultural exhibitions, the creation of four Confucius Institutes<sup>68</sup> between 2009 and 2010, the scholarships, and the Chinese film festival tops off its policy of seduction of the Tusans as well as the Peruvians. But the situation is not as simple and idyllic as it appears.

Numerous regional associations little by little have been taken over by the new immigrants. This is the case of the associations in the North coast (Chiclayo, Chimbote, Huaral, Piura,

Trujillo), and in the South coast (Cañete) and in the Amazon (Iquitos). Helped by their embassy, the new directors openly favor Chinese politics and even support the propagation of an extremely positive image of China. In Lima, within the associations, the Cantonese who arrived after 1980 are insistent and will soon take power.

In the capital, the repeated visits to the different associations by the delegates from the Bureau of Chinese Overseas and the Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation often conclude with offers of cooperation at the economic level between their members and the cities or districts which send them. The associations bring their logistic support to their new friends. One notes therefore the appearance of the association of Dongguan whose members were previously attached to the Pun Yui society. Apparently in addition to the linguistic criterion, (the Dongguan are in majority Hakkas) it is above all the economic advantages which motivated its creation in 2009. The creation in December 2010 of the new Kaiping association also responds to the call of the Kaiping authorities to draw closer to their district of origin so as "to work in favor of Sino-Peruvian relations and collaborate together on projects for health, education and for the profit of Peruvian society,"<sup>69</sup> but it concerns above all common economic interests. In this case, in 2011 on the occasion of the visit of a delegation from Jiangmen, the administrative capital with authority over Kaiping, the association became a go-between of the Permanent Consultative Conference of the city in order to be connected with a Tusan personality. The Toishan society, which depends on Jiangmen too, was also formed around the same aim: to celebrate and enhance Mont Taishan, sacred mountain of Taoism in Shangdong. This creation led to a ceremony attended by a member of the Chinese Embassy and 500 people. The background of this assembly is the town of Zibo, hub of an industrial area (oil, organic chemistry) very interested in Peruvian resources. Contacts between China and the associations have started up again but they are perceived only as relays in the service of regional ambitions. The term "overseas," which used to imply distance and mutual aid, has now a purely economic resonance, the relation of a commercial house with its subsidiary. This is its original meaning but it had a less aggressive mercantile form.

## The Tusans

After becoming independent from the old generation, abandoning the Chinese quarter and diversifying their professional activities, the Tusans have formed their own associations. The Tusan community is cemented together by their common education at the Juan XXIII primary and secondary school run by the Chinese curacy. The Tusans who came out of this school established in 1962 are very united; they get together in the Centro Cultural Peruano-Chino, the Peruvian-Chinese Cultural Center and its recreational center *Villa Tusan* and in the Instituto Cultural Peruano-Chino, the Peruvian-Chinese Cultural Institute. In a certain way, the Franciscans of the curacy have allowed the descendants of the Chinese to construct their own Tusan identity, to integrate themselves while still remaining in a closed universe. Erasmo Wong Lu, a Tusan particularly attached to the Confucian values of China, who possesses with his family the biggest supermarket chain in the country,<sup>70</sup> contributes to strengthening the relation links of the Tusans to China. In 1999, on the occasion of the celebration of the 150 years of Chinese presence in Peru, Erasmo Wong Lu created a new association, the APCH, Association Peruano-China. Its aim, clearly stated in its review *Integración*: to reassemble all the Tusans of the old and new generations and form the young "Heirs of the Dragon" to work with China to develop commercial exchanges, to serve as a bridge between the two countries and become indispensable in the exchanges with Peru's first commercial partner. This generation is expected to create a return toward China while remaining profoundly Peruvian.<sup>71</sup> The APCH, led by a



wealthy Tusan elite, would like to impose the Tusan label, give the Tusans greater visibility, a pride, but it does not really reflect on what a Tusan is in relation to the new Chinese immigrants nor on what should be their relations with China. Nor does the APCH reflect on the reasons for its lack of success because of its weak capacity to integrate the new immigrants and their children, whether they are Cantonese or from another province; a failure which it shares with the Beneficencia. For the APCH, the Tusans should project an image of success, as it is that of China.

The arrival of the new Chinese immigrants disrupts this equilibrium between the members of the Chinese community, and calls into question the foundation of its identity. The Fujianese continue to bring over the members of their family and choose to remain in Peru for a longer term. However, they are not drawing closer to the Cantonese. Although they formed a regional association in July 2008 and inaugurated the premises in 2010, the Fujianese, in Peru for more than ten years, still suffer from a bad reputation and are still not represented within the Beneficencia China. The difference in "dialect" is now disappearing with the use of Mandarin, but there exists a fierce competition in the import of Chinese manufactured products, particularly concerning their distribution in the Chinese quarter. The Fujianese are the first to leave the quarter to conquer new spaces in the "conos" or emerging quarters. But in these districts, very attractive because they are not yet totally urbanized and are advantageous for investors, one also finds, besides Fujianese and the Tusans, immigrants from different Chinese provinces, small investors looking for land for a factory or a warehouse.

The newcomers have no problems of identity. They apply very quickly for a change in immigrant status to obtain that of resident immigrant. The majority requests naturalization after four years' residence. This naturalization is easily bought;<sup>72</sup> it is considered a necessary step for the success of an economic project. This does not mean integration since the newcomers count on their mobility to react quickly as opportunities present themselves. They are helped by the publication of a review, *Nueva Vision* (*Xin Shiye*) which guides them in their approaches, warns them of all the dangers they might meet (thieves, counterfeit money, dangerous locations, how to pay taxes, open a shop, etc.). The *Diario Comercial* (*Bilua Shangbao*) welcomes their advertisements, the most numerous being those of the mining companies offering work to professionals who have studied exclusively in China.

In addition to the mobility of these resident-immigrants one observes the movements of circulation which concern Chinese Ecuadorians, Argentines, Venezuelans and Bolivians entering Peru on business or to try to settle there. As we can see in Figure 23.2, this mobility is also found in the interior of the country in their capacity to jump to the strategic points (frontier towns, mining centers, touristic towns, port cities) as much as to adapt to less attractive regions (emerging districts, small provincial cities). Their mobility explains why they do not involve themselves in community life. As for the immigrants under contract, they move very little and are confined either in the mines or in Lima to the place chosen by their employers. These immigrants do not think of the space in which they live as a territory or a nation, but only as an economic space.

## Conclusion

The Chinese community, that is the legitimate Chinese and the Tusans, have become creolized. The essential traits of their culture have been preserved and their relation with China was more emotional than political and economic. Times have changed. The policy of seduction which China practices is not only directed toward the Peruvians or the Latin Americans but also has impacts on the institutions of the Chinese who have been there for a century and a half, including attracting the young generations. The return to Chineseness is taking place slowly.




Figure 23.3 Chinese traders register, district of Barranco (Lima) 1946 (Photograph by Isabelle Lausent-Herrera, Walter Huamani Private Collection, 2009)



Figure 23.4 Old Chinese restaurant (*chifa*) in a popular neighborhood in Lima (Photograph by Isabelle Lausent-Herrera, 2004)

Replacement of the authorities of the Beneficencia is already in place in the provinces and the speeches demanding unity and reassembling of the Chinese living in Peru are those of the presidents of the Beneficencia as well as those of the APCH. The Cantonese language and the Hakka most spoken in the past are retreating before the Putonghua spoken by the new immigrants and the young scholarship holders. The cultural as well as the economic links have been tightened. In spite of the important demographic changes it has undergone, the Peruvians still see the Chinese community as homogeneous. However, the coexistence of an "old" community comprising Tusans and Cantonese immigrants, and a new, mostly Fujianese, is source of internal tensions and carries the seed of future changes. In the past creolization was not viewed as bad although the preference was for marriages between the China-borns, followed by between the China-borns

and Tusans and finally among the Tusans themselves. This tolerance sheltered the community from an excess of nationalism. However, one sees in the new arrivals, not all but a majority, strong nationalistic feelings leading them to refuse mixed marriages and to doubt the usefulness of the old structures such as the *huiguan* and the Sociedad de Beneficencia, except purely economically.

The image of many layers to characterize the actual situation of the Peruvian Chinese community is tempting insofar as the Chinese immigrants from different provinces arrived in Peru, and there appear no link between them and those who had arrived before except for the common nationalism. The Beneficencia and the Tusans still form a communitarian whole which, by its identity and its institutions typically and exclusively Cantonese, cannot at present integrate the newcomers. On one side we have the Chinese community of Peru and on the other the Chinese immigrants, residents and the children of residents who do not form a community. Moreover, Peru which was a country of rapid transit for the Chinese entering with the aim of going to the USA has in recent years become a country of medium-term transit and thus of residence, too. These migratory phenomena are new, rapid, and at times fugitive. It is very difficult, in the case of Peru, to answer with certainty how this community will evolve. Will it be able to integrate the residents from all the provinces from China? Under the pressure of Chinese embassy officials, the most probable outcome would be a new supra-community structure and new governance rules, ending 160 years of Cantonese cultural domination and a community organization attached to that cultural tradition. How many Chinese will settle down definitively? Will the mixed marriages lead to more integration? There are no answers yet and it will take several years more to observe and understand these changes.

## Appendix

### Primary sources

#### I. General Direction of Migration and Naturalization (DIGEMIN)

DIGEMIN Trámites Aprobados de cambio de calidad migratoria solicitados por ciudadanos chinos años 2004–9, unpublished records.

- DIGEMIN Fichas de inscripción de los inmigrantes 2009–10. (18/12/2009 al 15/01/2010 et du 15/01/2010 al 2/12/2010). Tomo 2009, tomo 2010, unpublished records.
- DIGEMIN Depósito para el año 2010 de los proyectos de factibilidad por Inmigrantes (IIA). (inmigrantes residentes), unpublished records.
- DIGEMIN Solicitudes de visas temporales. DIGEMIN 2002, 1er semestre, unpublished records.
- DIGEMIN Naturalizaciones de Chinos, 2000–2009, unpublished data.
- DIGEMIN Chinos residentes en Perú en 2010, unpublished micro-data.
- DIGEMIN Flujos de entradas y salidas del Perú de Chinos. Enero 2010–Setiembre 2011, unpublished micro-data.

#### II. National Institute for Statistics and Information Technology (INEI)

- V Censo de Población de 1940, INEI.
- VI Censo de Población y I de Vivienda de 1961, INEI.
- VII Censo de Población y II de Vivienda de 1972, INEI.
- VIII Censo de Población, III Censo de Vivienda de 1981, INEI.
- IX Censo de Población y IV de Vivienda de 1993, INEI.
- XI Censo de Población y VI de Vivienda de 2007, INEI.

## Notes

- 1 These micro-data bases concern visa applicants and guarantors in 2002–3; changes in migratory status during the period 2004–9, individual records concerning all the Chinese present in 2010 and the entries and exits of Chinese in 2010–11. Dirección General de Migraciones y Naturalización (General Direction of Migration and Naturalization), Lima. My thanks to INEI (National Institute for Statistics and Information Technology) and to Mr. Hererra for giving me access and processing the DIGEMIN micro-data base and the 1993 and 2007 censuses.
- 2 This estimation is more than the numbers given by the first researchers, among them Watt Stewart (1976) and M. Castro de Mendoza (1989) who for this period took the number of coolies who embarked and arrived at the port of Callao (Lima). Actually the list of ships is incomplete and it is recognized that the boats brought in their human cargoes directly in certain seaports close to the great sugar plantations, thus escaping the control of customs and tax collectors.
- 3 Ministerio de Gobierno Policía y Obras Públicas, 1878. *Censo General de la República del Perú formado en 1876*, imprenta del Estado, Lima. The bad conditions under which this census was carried out – particularly in the province – suggest that the number of Chinese was slightly underestimated.
- 4 Actually two other associations were created simultaneously in October 1881, the first at the initiative of the secret societies and the second, instigated by the Chinese Catholics; they preceded the official creation of the Tonghuy Chongkoc (on this theme, see Lausent-Herrera (1997: 133; 2000)).
- 5 Lausent-Herrera (2007: 44) presents the case of the introduction of a widow and her two “sons”.
- 6 It seems that this route was essentially taken by the immigrants from the Hakka dialectal group, from the county of Chockai (Chixi) and Zhongshan. See Lausent-Herrera (1996).
- 7 This concerns the regimes of L.M. Sanchez Cerro (1930–3) and O. Benvides (1933–9).
- 8 A quota of 20 people a month was installed but not respected. These quotas were more severely imposed on the Chinese than on the Japanese who from 1899 had immigrated to Peru. See Lausent-Herrera (1991).
- 9 *Tusan* in Cantonese or *tusheng* in Mandarin is the term used to designate the children born in Peru to Chinese parents. In the years 1930–40 this term tended to include mixed blood children. It is now used in a still larger sense and may mean Chinese descendants of the second or third generation.
- 10 On the role of the women and the story of their lives, see Lausent-Herrera (1997, 2007).
- 11 In May 1940 anti-Japanese riots broke out. Following this, in 1940, 1,800 Japanese were deported into internment camps in the USA while the rest of the Japanese community was under house arrest. The Chinese were spared but once again handled roughly after the war (Lausent-Herrera 1991: 28).
- 12 P. Kwong remembers that at the end of the 1960s the Chinese Government opened its frontiers voluntarily so that a flow of refugees arrived in Hong Kong, in order to destabilize the British colony (Kwong 1977: 28). The immigrants who arrived during this period illegally in Peru were a part of those who “profited” from this opportunity.
- 13 This route went through Panama which allowed the two communities linked by kinship and community and political institutions to keep close relations.
- 14 A certain number of interviews with women born in the years 1940–50 indicated however that there had been immigration, illegal but significant, of young men and women of this generation fleeing the great famines and the Cultural Revolution.
- 15 *III Censo de población, III Censo de Vivienda de 1981*, INEI. Total population: 17,762,231 inhabitants.
- 16 *I° Censo de población de 1940*: total population of Peru, INEI: 7,023,111. Chinese: men: 10,365; women: 550.
- 17 In 1980 with the return to democracy hyperinflation began which in 1991 reached 8000% as well as a long period of insecurity due to the terrorist activities of the Shining Path and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru) (founded by a Chinese descendant). According to a publication of the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Relations, “*Secretaría de comunidades peruanas en el exterior: estadísticas, 2005*” there were between 1,800,000 and 2,200,000 Peruvian immigrants in foreign countries. According to the Peruvian source, there were 935,855 in the USA and 68,649 in Japan. J. Durand (2008: 36) uses the lower number of 233,926 Peruvians, according to the US Census Bureau, 2000.
- 18 *I° Censo de Población y I de Vivienda de 1961*, INEI.
- 19 *II° Censo de Población y II de Vivienda de 1972*, INEI.
- 20 There were 24 people with no information.
- 21 The entries and exits to and from the territory, by nationality, at the different customs posts were not systematically recorded. They were partially recorded in the 1990s and should be completely from

- 2009 on. Figures from before 1995, taken up by the INEI and the DIGEMIN come from the Ministry of the Interior.
- 22 *VIII Censo de Población y III de Vivienda de 1981*, INEI.
- 23 After 1971 the Chinese born in China residing in Peru had to choose their nationality. A certain number faithful to Guomindang asked for a Taiwanese or Peruvian passport and left the country because the tensions following the arrival of the diplomatic corps of the People's Republic were great. Another group, including those from the local associations (*huiguan*) chose the People's Republic. At present it is not possible to have access to the archives concerning the naturalizations for this period but from certain testimonies many Chinese born in China and their children born in Peru (*Tusans*) who were registered at the consulate in Taiwan became naturalized Peruvians. In the same way, these same Chinese, for political and economic reasons, left Peru for the USA and Canada. Finally, among the Chinese who had at that time the Taiwanese nationality, one should count those who left the People's Republic illegally, helped by the Mafia networks of Hong Kong and Taiwan.
- 24 *IX Censo de Población y IV de Vivienda de 1993*, INEI.
- 25 To which is added 63 Taiwan-born Chinese.
- 26 *XI Censo de Población y VI de Vivienda de 2007*, INEI.
- 27 A more plausible explanation, developed below, is that a big share of Chinese immigrants is coming not from China but from neighboring countries. Other explanations should consider naturalizations and Chinese holding false documents from other countries. In 2011 some Chinese restaurant owners were arrested holding "true false" Peruvian passports (*El Comercio*, 25 July 2011). The illegality, the confinement of the immigrants in transit in the houses or restaurants, explains in great part the difficulty to obtain the figures which correspond to the reality as well as the statistical "invisibility" of this population.
- 28 The routes taken by the snakeheads are multiple; they go either toward the Caribbean via Ecuador and Colombia or toward Central America. On this point, see Lausent-Herrera (2009a: 74).
- 29 Upon their arrival as tourists or businessmen, these immigrants are immediately taken in hand by people who are responsible for obtaining for them as quickly as possible, by paying, a change in their immigration status which allows them to get a commercial license, to find a place and to obtain a resident card. After waiting for two years they can bring over family members, (parents, grandparents, children) and after four years, be naturalized.
- 30 Since people acquiring Chinese nationality are very few, we expected the number of local-born Chinese leaving Peru to be as numerous as those holding the Chinese citizenship.
- 31 The figures communicated to me (31 July 2004) are all the more surprising – given the underestimation of the flux and the number of residents – that they concern almost equally men (9,767) and women (8,837) while today there still remains a strong imbalance between the sexes. Also, it is interesting to note that the years with the highest rate of naturalization coincide with the issuing in 1992 of the decree-law 663 "migración-inversión" (this point will be developed further on). The numbers diminish after 1996, after the beneficiaries of the law have acquired, in the two years following their arrival, Peruvian nationality. Later, when in December 2010 I requested the numbers of Chinese nationalized for the period 2000–9, the DIGEMIN director indicated that there had been 302 naturalizations of Chinese!
- 32 The situation is evolving and the size of the families of the new immigrants tends to increase. On this subject many of the women questioned do not want to have more than two children for economic reasons, especially if they already have a son. But many of them have nevertheless taken advantage of being in Peru to enlarge their family.
- 33 At the beginning of the 1980s there was a tentative, very detailed census carried out with the help of an American university, by the Franciscans who had just taken charge of the Chinese curacy in Peru. Few people accepted to fill out the whole form. The document has never been published.
- 34 "Chinese residents in Peru in 2010", DIGEMIN, unpublished micro-data.
- 35 This is a conservative estimate since it does not include those who left the country before 2010 nor those who adopted Peruvian citizenship and are no longer considered as Chinese by the Peruvian authorities.
- 36 The Peruvian authorities refused to extradite Wong Ho Wing accused of fiscal evasion with the argument that he will risk death for which there is no such punishment in Peru (*Peru 21*, 14 June 2011).
- 37 This concerns 235 files of visa applications by Chinese deposited at the DIGEMIN. These dossiers also contain references to 148 persons who were guarantors of the coming of future immigrants.
- 38 To be guarantor one must be resident in Peru for more than two years and in 2002 have a monthly revenue of at least \$684, thus at the level of the upper middle class (Lausent-Herrera 2009a: 88)

- 39 DIGEMIN "Tramites Aprobados de cambio de calidad migratoria solicitados por ciudadanos chinos años 2004-9." The regional origin of the applicants is more precisely indicated for the year 2009; for the preceding years a great number do not indicate their geographic origin. Thus between 2004-7 around 80% of the applicants gave no information concerning their regional origin. It seems that from 2008 on information was collected more strictly (24% nevertheless gave no response). We have therefore retained only 2009, which has 6.1% of non-responses out of a total of 897 applicants, the sample is thus 758 persons.
- 40 In 1868 three "Agencias", associations or companies preceding the formal creation of the *huiguans*, wrote a petition addressed to Prince Kung to request the protection of the imperial government. These three groups were the Cantonese, the Hakkas (Tung Sing) and the Ku y Kang (Guganzhou).
- 41 According to certain sources, an immigrant from Fuzhou who arrived in 1988 was at the origin of the organization of the arrival of numerous immigrants particularly from the mountainous region of Nanping. Other immigrants came from Quanzhou and Fuzhou.
- 42 Beneficencia China is run by three presidents, elected for three years from among the presidents of the native place associations. These authorities and the entire Cantonese community greatly distrust the Fujianese because their arrival was accompanied by the reinforcement of the mafia networks of human trafficking and the increase of extortions of the Chinese merchants. Beneficencia China helps the Fujianese (finding premises, Spanish lessons, low priced lodging, advice and care) but does not completely accept them. The Fujianese have recently officially formed their own association but it is still not integrated into Beneficencia China. After 20 years of presence in Peru the Fujianese have no position of responsibility at the community level.
- 43 DIGEMIN, 2004-9.
- 44 Residence is normally obtained after two years' presence in Peru. Corruption of the DIGEMIN employees, denounced for several years now, allows it to be obtained much more rapidly.
- 45 Maquiladora is an assembly plant operating on the US-Mexico border to which inputs and parts are shipped and from which the finished-assembled-final product is shipped to the USA. By extension this way of organizing production and trade can be found in other countries sharing a common frontier. The Ley ATPDEA was promulgated in 1991 to favor the diversification of production in the Andean countries and to allow their exportation to the USA so as to eradicate coca culture progression in these countries. Certain products in competition with American industry, such as textiles, could not benefit from the tax exemptions offered by this law. In 2008 its modification authorized textile products made in these Andean countries to enter the USA benefiting from the tax exemptions. See Documentos Informativos SG/di948 de la Comunidad Andina, 12 July 2009.
- 46 The names of the persons mentioned hereafter have been changed.
- 47 DIGEMIN, *Deposito para el año 2010 de los proyectos de factibilidad por Inmigrantes (IIA)*. The applicants most frequently justify their project by citing unemployment (essentially in the most underprivileged classes) and the lack of technical innovations in Peru.
- 48 We should note here that from 20 June 2008, Chinese from the People's Republic of China no longer need a visa to enter Ecuador. From 20 June to 30 November 2008, 10,638 Chinese, the majority from Fujian, entered Ecuador, specifically at Guayaquil (*El Comercio*, 9-10 December 2008).
- 49 This part of our study was based on the unpublished data from the DIGEMIN
- 50 The Shougang Corporation (Beijing) is one of the first Chinese companies installed in Peru after buying *Hierro Peru*, a national steel company, privatized by President Fujimori in 1992. It is the first to have brought over its employees and workers in 1994. It was followed by a great number of mining and oil companies.
- 51 DIGEMIN.
- 52 For two decades the CCPIT (Council for the Promotion of International Trade) has encouraged foreign visits of delegations from the Chinese provinces to support projects for promotion of products and provincial companies, offering them incentives and help in exporting and encouraging technological exchanges. Some small companies semi-privatized and privatized follow the same incentive. In this framework with an accelerated rhythm since 2000 a certain number of Chinese workers, executives, engineers, technicians, lawyers, prospectors and investors have been installed principally in the capital but also more and more in the province. It is not easy to situate them for several reasons: during a very long period these workers did not appear as immigrants, even temporarily, for they benefited from diplomatic passports issued by the regional governments.
- 53 Up till now we have not seen any regrouping of the Wenzhou immigrants in Peru.
- 54 Fuda Mining, created in 2009, is a subsidiary of the Anhui Geology and Mining Investment.

- 55 DIGEMIN Fichas de inscripción de los inmigrantes 2009–10.
- 56 Jin Zhao Peru, subsidiary of Zibo Hongda Mining. This mine has the project Pampa de Pongo in the south of the country, the Arequipa region.
- 57 Tianjin's vocation as a port explains this presence but as the definition of "Tripulante" is not stated by the DIGEMIN, it is not possible for us to know if these are fishermen linked to a fishing enterprise established in Peru or if they are sailors at the end of their contract, settling in Peru.
- 58 Fifth China-Latin America Business Summit, 21–22 November 2011. See the publication *Chinese Business Delegation* published by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT).
- 59 The Dongbei arrived in France as in Peru starting in 1999.
- 60 These activities and projects, at the small business level – but not the large groups – are generally associated with laundering money from China.
- 61 Communication from the Press Office of the *Federación Minera de Madre de Dios*, 8 June 2010. *Los Andes*, 23 June 2010. Numerous articles have been published on this subject.
- 62 The arrest in July 2011 of several Chinese gold miners at Quincemil (Cuzco) and Yanamayo (*El Peruano*, 25 July 2011). *El Comercio* (25 July 2011) sheds light on several facts: several of the stockholders possessed false identity papers (false naturalizations), one of them had already been arrested for human trafficking and forging false passports. These Chinese were sometimes associated with Koreans who were also involved in these affairs. Finally, the cost of informal extraction is very high (a dredge costs \$400,000) but this is quickly made up for by the profits. A certain number of investors are suspected of laundering money from corruption in China (see *El Comercio*, 29 February 2011 and *La República*, 22 March 2009).
- 63 These are from the regions of Zhongshan, Pun Yui, Cu Con Chau, Hok Shan, Tong Shing, Long Kong, Lung Sing Sea, Nam Joy and the *Sociedad de Beneficencia del Callo* formerly *Wu'an gongshuo*, (spelling according to variations in use in the community).
- 64 On the relations between the Asociación Central de Beneficencia China, its associations and the Tusans, see Lausent-Herrera (2009b).
- 65 These are the *Sociedad Central de la Colonia China*, la *Sociedad Chung Wo* (Callao), *Peng Cheng Hui* (Miraflores), *Camara de Comercio de Taiwan en el Perú*.
- 66 In 1989 the Commission in charge of Chinese Affairs Overseas of the Popular Assembly of the PRC (People's Republic of China) visited the Chinese communities of Latin America, including that of Peru, to learn their economic situation and their contribution to the economy of the country in which they live.
- 67 On 13 November 2010, the universities and colleges of Beijing toured Latin America, and held a forum in Lima to introduce their campuses for the Tusans and China-born Chinese.
- 68 These institutes have agreements with the Catholic University of Peru, the Catholic University Santa María of Arequipa, the *Universidad de Piura* (Opus Dei), *Universidad Ricardo Palma*, whose rector is a Tusan, José A. Change who has also been Minister of Education under President A. García (2006–11).
- 69 *Oriental* no. 975, August–September 2011.
- 70 In 2003 they sold their stocks to a Chilean group, CENCOSUD.
- 71 In 1986 Erasmo Wong organized a grand parade ("El gran corso de Wong") for the Peruvian national holiday. Each year this parade which delights the public has become the symbol of Peruvian nationalism.
- 72 On this subject, several scandals have broken out in Peru. See *El Comercio*, 21 February 2008 which already denounced the purchase of Peruvian passports. The employees of the DIGEMIN were accused as well as those of the *Registro nacional de identidad*.

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